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In rfhe Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
L. A. YOUNG SONS CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STATE TAX COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
Defendant. 
Case No. 
11467 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT 
ST A TEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is a proceding to review a determination of the Utah 
State Tax Commission, which held that a deficiency use tax in 
the amount of $ 5, 5 40.24 was properly assesed against the tax-
payer, L. A. Young Sons Construction Company, a partner-
ship, for construction equipment purchased at an auction out-
side the State of Utah, brought into and used in the State of 
Utah. 
DISPOSITION BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX 
COMMISSION 
A formal hearing on this matter was held befo:·c all nem-
bers of the Utah State Tax Commission (hereinafter referred 
2 
to ,~s i:he Con~m;ssicn) on October 25, 1968, and on December 
4, 1968, the ComP1ission entered its unanimous decision, num-
ber 2/2, uphold;ng the deficiency assessment. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The plaintiff se~ks to h'.tve the decision of the Utah State 
Tax Commission reversed. 
ST K"EMENT OF FACTS 
The parties to this ::i.ction have entered into a stipulation 
of facts (R. 39-50) and these facts are incorporated into, ;i.rd 
rest:>.':ed in the decis;on of the Commission (R. 5 6-60), and in 
pla~ntiff's brief; however, it seems appropriate at this point to 
emphasize several ::i.dditioml facts which were not stressed in 
plaintiff's brief. 
When plaintiff purchased the said equipment at the auction 
in Wyoming, it did not purchase the entire amount of property 
and equipment which w:is sold by Amis Construction Comp-
any. To the contrarv, plaintiff purchased only six out of 2 3 2 
separate p:eces of equipm-o·,1t whic:h were sold at the auction in 
\Vyoming on August 2 5, 1961. The 2 3 2 separate pieces of 
equipment sold by Amis Consi:ruction Company, sold for a 
total selling price of $789,737.50, of which the six pieces of 
eq uipmrnt purchased bv pbintiff constituted $13 9, 5 00 of said 
wm. The price for the smallest sale made was $ 2. 5 0, and the 
price foi th-: l:·rge~t icc1, or group of ;terns, sole! ,,-,,s P39,500 
for the sales to plaintiff. h should also be stressed that a sim-
ilar sale was held by Amis Construction Company in Topeka, 
Kamas on the day p:-ereding tb:: sale to the plaintiff. It should 
furth.~r L~ 5tressed, that both sales were conducted and handled 
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by Forkc Brnthers, an auctioneering firm which frequently 
hanc11.~s simi·ar sales. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
Tl-11~ SALE OF CONSTRUCTION EQUIPMENT BY 
ONE CONTRACTOR TO ANOTHER CONTRACTOR, 
1\T AN AUCTION, IS NOT AN ISOLATED OR AN OC-
C:\2:IONJ\L SALE WHEN NUMEP,OUS ITEMS OF EQUIP-
MENT ARC SOLD BY TEE SEL1-ER TO MANY DIFFER-
1~ n I'.JRCHASERS AT SUCH AUCTION. 
Plaintiff ;:illeges th1t the sale of construction equipment 
111 que.;tion -::''?.> a1.1 ioobtccl or occasional sale under Section 59-
i 5-2 (e), Ucih Code 1".nno'ated 1953, as amended, and that 
bcc:iu:c of such isolated or occasional sale, said sale is exempt 
from Utd1 use tax. 
T11 e foes of this cas: clearly point out that such sale could 
not pos:.;ibly be cons;dcred to be ";::olated or occasional". At 
th.: sale of the equipment, 232 pieces of equipment were sold 
by i:ht: seller, thrnush ~-n auctioneer, to m~ny d:fferent pnrch-
"sc:s (R. 47-50). Phnt:ff purchased only s:x of the 232 sold, 
and p:iid aporoximat'."ly 17.6c;~ of the total amounts paid to the 
sellc:·. 
Althr1ugh pbinriff m,1y c0ntend that this merely constitut-
,·d one sale to plaintiff, and is thcrefcrc an ;sJ!:ited or occ~.s­
iond s~k, it is de~r from the stipulated facts, that when 232 
cCp:trate items arc s'Jld :tt nn oHJCtion, it l"eCjUirc:; 232 serar:1te 
'ales. The aucr:aneer ;s rcC!uircd to place 232 items U? for sale, 
:md is reql'ired to rcc-eive a i:op bid o:i. och cf those 232 items 
and li.1mm,~:- the gavel dovm 232timcs. In add;tic:-i, rhe seller, 
ihrough the S:lme auctioneer, held a similar auction just the 
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day preceeding the sales in question. Although it does not appear 
from the record, it is likely to assume that a similar number of 
items were 5old the preceding day through the same auctioneer 
for a total of over 400 separate sales in a time space of only 
two days. 
The provision which excludes isolated and occisional sales 
from the term "retail sales", Section 59-15-2 (e), Utah (',('de 
Annotated 19 5 3, as amended, is contained in the definitions 
portion of the sales tax act. The relevent portions of that stat-
ute read as follows: 
"The term 'retail sale' means every sale within 
the State of Utah by a retailer or wholesaler by a 
user or consumer, except such sales as are defined as 
wholesale sales or otherwise exempted by the terms of 
this act: but the term 'retail sale' is not intended to 
include isolated or occasional sales by persons ;'eguar-
lJ' engaged in business, ... " (Emphasis added.) 
Plaintiff urges that because of the above statute, and be-
cause of regulation S38 of the Utah State Tax Commission, this 
sale is an isolated or occasional sJle. Regulation S3 8 of th~ State 
Tax Commission at the time of the transaction involved, was 
also quoted in plaintiff's brief and read as follows: 
"S3 8. Isolated and occasional sales (applies to 
sales and use taxes) . Isolated or occasional sales made 
by persons not regularly engaged in business are not 
subject to the tax. Undt>r this rule no sale is taxable 
if it is not made in the -regular course of a business 
of a person making retail sales as defined in regula-
tion no. S27. The word 'business' as thus used refers 
to an enterprize engaged in making retail sales not 
withstanding the fart that the sales may be few or 
infrequent." (Emphasis added.) 
In addition, the State Tax Commission, in 1967, amended 
regulation S3 8 to add the following provision: 
"Sales of items at public auctions do not qualify 
as exempt isolated or occasional sales." 
This regulation regarding auctions was merely a declara-
tion of the Commission's existing policy, and was not a new 
pronouncement on the subject. 
The State Tax Commission's interpretation of what consti-
tntes ~m isolated or occasional sale has previously been accept-
ed by the Court in the case of Grnez'a Steel Co. i'. State Tax 
C1;111111ission, 116 Utah 170, 209 r.2d 203 ( 1949), at page 177-
79 of the UL1h Reports. 
Although the Utah Supreme Court, in the Gc11ern Steel 
case supra, held that the transfer of the entire Geneva Steel 
oper:Hion was an isolated or occasional sale, they have had very 
few other opportunities to determine what is an isolated or an 
occasional sale. 
The St::te of C?.lifornia also excludes ocosion·J ~1t.:~, :mcl 
defines occa~ional sJ.les, in a statute similar to Utah's, as follows: 
"A sale of property not held or used by a seller 
in the course of an activity for which he is required 
to hold a sellers permit, prov id rd that such sale is 110t 
one of 11 serie;- of sales sufficient i11 number, scope and 
characta to comtit11te a11 arli1'ity ;·equjri11g the hold-
ing of a sellers permit; ... " (Emphasis added.) Sect-
ion 6006. 5, Californina Revenue and Taxation Code. 
The Supreme Court of California has had numerious occas-
ions to interpret this provision, and some of thcise decisions 
are similar to the present case. 
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The most factually similar California case is the ca~c of 
Pacific Pipe!ine C011strnctio1i I'. Stair Bo,m! of Equdi:::,1fio11, 
321 P.2d 729, 429 C.2d 729. The facts <if that CJSe are stated 
by Justice Traynor, at page 731 of the Pacific 2d Reports, as 
follows: 
"Plaintiff's own evidence shows that in 19 sepa-
rate s:,les, in addition to the sJ'.c ;n c1ut:st:i::n, :t s~l.2 
at various times from 1947 through 1950, 65 items of 
equipment for a total of $41,879.22. Three sales took 
place within six months preceeding the o:-ile in guest-
ion and two in the month fol!ow:ng. The items rnlcl 
from 1947 to 1950 included trucks, automobiles, fC'l-
erators, a compressor, a steam cleaner, cranes, tra 'le:·s, 
tar pots, and dynamometer. The items sold in the ~:ile 
in question included trucks, an automobile, generators, 
steam cleaners,. cranes and crane attachments, trailers 
and tar pots." 
Justice Traynor's conclusion as to whether er not this was 
an occasional s~.le was summerized as follows: 
"The undisputed evidence shows that the sale 1vas 
one of a series of sales sufficient in number, scope and 
character . . . and was therefore not an occasional 
S8Je .... " 
Justice Traynor then went on to summenze the previous 
California Supreme Court's similar decisions, and the terms 
"number, scope, and char;icter", as follows: 
"In fact, the words of the statute 'number, scope 
and character' were apparently taken from this court's 
opinion in Northwestern Pa.cific R.R. Co. v. Statr 
Board of Equ(?lization, 21 Cal. 2d 524, 529, 133 P.2d 
400. That case held that five sales of rolling ~tock over 
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a three year period for about $100,000 could not be 
regarded as casual 01 isob!cd sales, and that the seller 
was the1efore a retailer and the tax applied. Market 
Street Ry. Co. v. California State Board of Equaliza-
tion, 137 Cal. App. 2d 87, 95, 290, P.2d 20, 25, in-
volved about 900 sales totalling about $100,000 dur-
ing a 15 year period. Cons;dering the 'number, scope, 
and character of the transfers,' the court held the 
seller to be a retailer. Los Angeles City High School 
District 11. State Board of Equalization, 71 Cal. App. 
2d 486, 488 489, 163 P.2d 45, held that sales of build-
ings, improvements, and equipment not needed by the 
school <listr;ct, averaging two to three sales per quarter 
over a three year period were sufficient to make the 
sellers retailers and subject to the tax. Moreover, Sutter 
Packing Co. i·. State Board of Equalization, 139 Cal. 
App. 2d 889, 895-396, 295 P.2d 1083, 1087 ... held 
that a sale consumm:ited on June 1, 1949, was one of a 
series and that the gross receipts therefrom must be 
included in the measure of the tax although they to-
taled $700,000 and the gross receipts from the largest 
sale since 1945 had totaled only $12,063.69." (Em-
phasis added.) 
The po1gnmt :rnalysis by Justice Traynor is analagous to 
che C8se at hand. It is respectfully submitted that the purchase 
of equipment by pbintiff w;>s not an "isolated or occasional 
sale" and plainriff's petition for a revers:il should be denied. 
POINT II 
THE ISOLATED OR OCCASIONAL SALE ~XEMP­
TION CONTAINED IN SECTION 59-15-2, UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED 1953, AS AMENDED, DOES NOT APPLY 
TO USE TAX ON OUT OF ST A TE PURCHASES. 
Plaintiff goes to great length to convince the court that 
the s:tles and use tax arc ro be considered correlative and comp-
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lementary, and that the legislative created specific exemptions 
from the sales tax act are to be treated as exemptions from 
the use tax act. The Commission, however, does not deny that 
general statement, but merely disagrees as to the application of 
that general statement to the case at hand. 
In Genel'a Steel Cri. 1·. Stc:fc Tax Commis·.;0:1, s•:,':r(I, for-
mer Chief Justice Lester A. \Vade's dissent elequently points 
out that all sales exempt from the sales tax act cannot be ex-
empt from the use tax, or there would be no purpose in hav-
ing a use tax act. Therefore, there must be some line drawn 
between what is taxable under the sales tax act, :md what i5 
taxable under the use tax act. Justice Wade stated that ;n hi' 
opm10n, the exemptions from use tax should be determined :is 
follows: 
"The reasonable place to draw this line is, in my 
opinion, to hold that where a sale, though not expres-
sly exempted therefrom, does not come within the 
scope of the sales tax act, but does come within the 
scope of the use tax act and is not expressly exempted 
therefrom and there is an appearent reason why such 
sale should be subject to .the use tax though not sub-
ject to the sales tax, then such sale is subject to the 
use tax. However, every sale which comes within the 
general scope of the sales tax act but is expressly ex-
empted from the tax where there is no appc:irent rea-
son that such sale should be exempted from the sales 
tax and not from the use tax, should also be treated 
as exempted from the use tax." 
The "appcarent reason" for exemption from the use tax 
which Justice Wade would require is not evident in the case at 
hand. The obvious reason why the sales tax act exempts "isolated 
and occasional sales" from its purview, is because of the admin-
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istrative difficulty in enforcing the sales tax on sales made be-
tween individuals where the State Tax Commission can have 
very little, if any, control over such sales. To attempt to im-
pose a tax on di transactions between individuals, would be 
an administrative impossibility and that is the reason the stat-
ute,~ 59-12-2 (e), Utah Code Annotated 1953, excludes only 
"isolated (or) occasional sales by persons not regularly engagl'd 
iii bushzess ... . " (Emphasis added.) 
On the other hand, the policy for making all legislative-
created sales tax exemptions apply to the use tax, is to prevent 
discrimination against out-of slate purchases. Instead, plaintiff 
here urges this court to discriminate in favor of out-of-state 
purchases. The legislature clearly enacted the use tax so that 
out-of-state purchases could be taxed for sales on which sales 
tax would have been levied if the sale had been made within 
the State of Utah. 
Sales at auctions within the State of Utah would have been 
tax~d at the time of this transaction, are now being taxed under 
the present State Tax Commission Regulation S38, and should 
be taxed for auction s1les made outside the State of Utah under 
the use tax provisions. 
These points are adequately stressed by the reasonmg of 
Justice Wade in his dissent in the Geneua Steel case, supra, 
wherein he said: 
"Sales of tangible personal property only when 
m.ade within the state arc subject to the sales tax but 
such property sold outside this state for storage use or 
other consumption within this state is subject to the 
use tax .... Only sales made by a vendor regularly 
engaged in the business of selling to users or consum-
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ers and not for res:ile, are required to p::y ·ch:ct tax 
. . . . (A) 11 such vendors, before making any sales, 
arc requ:red to obuin :i license from Lhc next st:i:c. 
Since the only me::ms of collecting the t:ix is throvgh 
the vendor who is regubrly engaged in the bminess of 
making such sales it i~ ,~p)nrent why only rct:iil s:dcs 
and not occasional or lSolated s:iles \Vere nude suhject 
to that tax. It was not bcouse the legislature intended 
that occasimul er isolated sales 5hould not be subject 
to the tax, but w:is merely a matter of convenience 
in collecting the same. 
"That reason docs not apply to the use t::u:. Pro-
perty sold whether outside of or within the state for 
storage, use or othet· consumption in this st2,tc is ''~' ~~ 
ject to that tax when it is brought within ~h:s state 
and the purchaser where he did not purchase from and 
pay the t'1x to a vendcr regularly engaged in b<Jsin<:ss 
in this state w~s made liable to tre state for the py-
ment of s-wch tax i,yhe1:her the s~le was made in this 
state or not and it was imm:iterial whether it was an 
occasional or regul.ar sale (cites Twaits Co. v. Utah 
State Tax Coll:miss'ou, lOii Utah 343, 148 P.2d .',~3:: 
since, where the sale v.ras made outside oi ~:he :t?,te. 
t1x had to be collected from the purchaser, ic made no 
difference in such case whether the sale was an isola<:-
ed or occasional traruction or whe<:her it w~s made to 
a person regularly engaged in business, because this 
state did not require a person doing business in another 
state to collect this tax for it. So the convenience in 
collecting this tax from a person regularly engaged 
in bus:ness which existed in the c?se of the s_1le-: tax, 
and w:iS the re:.:i~on for lirniting th<: t tax to a reta ;1 
salts (sic) and for not coyering occ;;s;onal or isobt-
cd sales docs not exic.t in the case of the u~e tax." 
This definitive statement by Justice W adc, although con 
tained in his diEsenting opinion, is not conLrary to ?·n.y ho:din~ 
11 
of the r,ujo1ity opinion 111 the Grne1/(I Sfrcl case, supra, but is 
in~:;cative of the mmner in which the court would have applied 
che b•.'' w chc facts cf 'J1is case. ln the majority opinion, writ-
'Cen by Just:ce \'V olfe, the sentiment of the court was clearly 
expressed as follows: 
"The sale of property made outside this state is 
11ot subject to our sales tax, it being a sale which this 
state cannot constitutionally tax. But when such pro-
perty is brought into this state for storage, use or 
other consumption here, thus coming to rest as an inte-
grated part of the total property in this state, then the 
use tax comes into operation and taxes, not the event 
of the sale of the prcpe:ty, but the event of storage, 
use or other consumption of that property within this 
state. 
"We hold therefore, that the storage, use or other 
consumption of property, the sale of which is made in 
this state and "vhich is not made amendable to the 
sales tax, is likewise not subject to the use tax. Thus 
it follows that isolated or occasional sales made in this 
state are not subject to the operation of the use tax. 
We express no opinion as to whether isolated or occ11s-
io1111l sales made outoide of this state are subject to our 
use tax." (Emphasis 1dded) Geneva Steel Co. v. State 
Tax Commission, s11 pra. 
This same concept had been explained by the Utah Supreme 
Court in the decision, two years earlier, in the rehearing of 
U1,io11 Portla11d Cement Co. u. State Tax Commission, 110 Utah 
152, 176 P.2d 879 (1947), wherein Jmtice Wolfe, at page 157 
of the Utah Reports, stated as follows: 
"The use tax was not intended to create a discrim-
ination against out-of-state merchants in favor o. 
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Utah merchants. Rather it was ju1SSed ... to U'llZOt'c 
the theretofore existing discrimination against local 
merchants in favor of out-of-state merchant~ . . " 
(Emphasis Added.) 
At page 15 8 of the Utah Reports, the Court was even more 
explicit when it stated: 
"As before stated, the obz}ious purpose of the 
Use T,1x Act was frJ impose a tax on the use i11 this 
state of property thc sale of 11.!hich, because that sale 
tool?_ place outsidc thc sidc, was beyond the rcach of 
the Utah Sales Tax Act." (Emphasis added.) 
In addition, the court approved a statement from page 3 9 
of the Fourth Biennial Report of the Utah Statc Tax Commis-
sion which said: 
"The (use) tax applies primarily to goods shipped 
into the state in interstate commerce and to /mr.chases 
made outside of the state for use within the state, and 
in this manner acts as a jJrotcction and equalization 
to the Utah merchant against out-of-state merchants 
who may be selling to TJ!ah purchasers." (Emphasis 
added.) 
It should further be pointed out that the sales tax is a 
transaction tax and is not levied unless there is a transaction 
involving a "retail sale". On the other hand, the use tax does 
not require any specific transaction, but is levied upon the 
use, storage or consumption of property in the State of Utah. 
In addition, this statute,§ 59-15-2 (e) Utah Code Anno-
tated 1953, only excludes from retail sales, "isolated (or) occas-
ional sales by persons not regularly cngaged in business .... " 
In the case at hand, plaintiff, L. A. Young Sons Construction 
Co., and the auctioneer selling the property, Forke Brothers, 
are both certainly regularl-y e11 gaged in business. Therefore, that 
13 
exclusion should not apply to this case, even if the court should 
somehow decide that the above sale was an isolated or occas-
ional sale, :md should also somehow decide that that exclusion 
applies to use tax on out of state purchases. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that because of the large num-
ber of sales ( 2 3 2) occui-ing at the auction, and because of a 
similar number of sales the previous day by the same seller and 
auctioneer, :rnd because both the seller and the auctioneer are 
1cg11larly engaged in business, the six sales to plaintiff did not 
constitute an "isolated (or) occasional sale." 
It is further respectfully submitted that sales tax would 
have been added to the purchase price if the sale had occurred 
in Utah, and it is thei-efore within the intent of the Legislature 
to t:lx such transactions. It is also vital to the economic stabil-
ity of the State of Utah to avoid discrimination against Utah 
merchants, c~pecially in sales of this size where the difference in 
tax could well be sufficient inducement to purchase an item 
in another state rather than pay the Utah Sales or Use Tax. 
It is theerfore respectfully urged that the decision of the 
Utah State Tax Commission be sustained. 
Respectfully submitted 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
G. BLAINE DA VIS 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Defendant 
